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Polly Mitchell, Alan Cribb, and Vikki A Entwistle
Defining What is Good: Pluralism and 
Healthcare Quality
ABSTRACT. ‘Quality’ is a widely invoked concept in healthcare, which broadly 
captures how good or bad a healthcare service is. While quality has long been 
thought to be multidimensional, and thus constitutively plural, we suggest that 
quality is also plural in a further sense, namely that different conceptions of 
quality are appropriately invoked in different contexts, for different purposes. 
Conceptual diversity in the definition and specification of quality in healthcare 
is, we argue, not only inevitable but also valuable. To treat one conception of 
healthcare quality as universally definitive of good healthcare unjustifiably con-
strains the ways in which healthcare can be understood to be better or worse. This 
indicates that there are limits to the extent to which improvement activities should 
be coordinated or standardized across the healthcare sector. While there are good 
reasons to advocate greater coordination in healthcare improvement activities, 
harmonization efforts should not advance conceptual uniformity about quality.
1.INTRODUCTION
‘Quality’ is a widely invoked concept in healthcare, and ‘qual-ity improvement’ is now a central part of healthcare ser-vice delivery. However, these concepts and their associated 
 practices represent relatively uncharted territory for applied 
philosophy and bioethics. In this paper, we explore some of the concep-
tual complexity of quality in healthcare and argue that quality is best 
understood to be conceptually plural. Quality is widely agreed to be 
multidimensional and as such constitutively plural. However, we argue 
that quality is plural in two further senses. First, quality is competitively 
plural: that is, different high-level conceptions of quality can be appropri-
ately invoked in different contexts and serve different purposes. Second, 
quality is operationally plural: the same high-level conception of quality 
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can be justifiably operationalized differently in different contexts. We 
argue that this wide conceptual diversity in the definition, specification, 
and measurement of quality in healthcare is not only inevitable, but also 
valuable.
Our pluralist account of quality suggests that there are limits to the 
view, advocated in the healthcare improvement literature, that quality 
improvement activities should be better coordinated across the healthcare 
sector (Dixon-Woods and Martin 2016), raising questions about the extent 
to which such coordination is desirable. Whilst acknowledging the value 
of greater coordination, we argue that coordination—to the degree that 
this is taken to involve conceptual uniformity—is not valuable tout court. 
We suggest that any push for conceptual consistency must be accompanied 
by, and balanced with, an embrace of conceptual diversity. By the end 
of the paper we will have thus considered some substantive arguments 
for and against using standardized approaches to defining, specifying, 
and measuring quality. But beyond this, our account has more deep-
seated relevance to bioethics: a core component of our argument is that 
definitional debates about quality and quality measures only make sense 
against broader moral assessments of what count as relevant healthcare 
purposes and good healthcare.
The paper proceeds as follows. In §2, we start to unpack the concepts 
of ‘quality’ and ‘quality improvement’ in healthcare. In §3, we discuss the 
multidimensionality of quality and argue that definitions of quality are 
best understood to be heuristic tools, rather than attempts to characterize 
a single, determinate property of healthcare systems and processes. This 
indicates that quality is understood to be not just constitutively plural, 
but also competitively plural. In §4, we discuss the operationalization of 
quality in practice, arguing that quality is also operationally plural. We 
illustrate how practicing quality improvement typically involves conceptual 
interplay between more general definitions of quality and more specified 
accounts of the indicators and metrics for quality in particular contexts. In 
§5, we argue that these different forms of contextual variety are valuable 
and reflect substantive normative differences. We show how this creates 
challenges for consistency and comparability in healthcare improvement. 
In §6, we conclude that healthcare improvement should not pursue 
indiscriminate standardization or seek to erase diversity with respect to 
quality. Such diversity can reflect thoughtful and justified differences in 
the conception and operationalization of quality.
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2. ‘QUALITY’ AND ‘QUALITY IMPROVEMENT’ IN HEALTHCARE
Projects and programs to improve quality form a central part of healthcare 
delivery. In the UK, every healthcare provider must publish an annual 
‘quality account,’ providing detailed information on its processes and 
outcomes and responding to a set of questions in order to demonstrate the 
quality of its services (NHS 2019). Healthcare providers are monitored to 
ensure that they deliver high quality services (Care Quality Commission 
2017). The US has a National Strategy for Quality Improvement in 
Healthcare, which seeks to improve “overall quality,” improve “the 
health of the population,” and reduce the cost of quality care (Agency 
for Healthcare Research and Quality 2011). By 2009, eighteen European 
Union member states had a statutory legal requirement for healthcare 
organizations to have improvement systems (Spencer and Walshe 2009). 
Because of the significant role that they play in the design and delivery of 
healthcare services internationally, quality and quality improvement have 
considerable social and ethical impact. Different ways of understanding, 
defining, and measuring quality-related concepts and their role in 
healthcare delivery will result in diverse approaches to service design and, 
resultingly, different outcomes for patients and citizens. This section will 
start to flesh out what is meant, or what might be meant, by ‘quality’ and 
‘quality improvement’ in healthcare.
Quality in healthcare is, broadly, an assessment of how good or bad 
a healthcare service is, and improving quality is the process of making 
services better. Assessing the quality of healthcare must therefore start 
with some account of what quality consists in: what does good (and bad) 
healthcare look like? Improving the quality of healthcare must begin with 
some account of what improvement consists in: how can we tell whether 
one service is better than another? There is, then, an important moral 
dimension to defining and measuring quality in healthcare, as it involves 
saying something about what good healthcare and healthcare systems 
look like and how clinicians, healthcare managers, and policy-makers 
ought to act. However, ‘quality’ and ‘quality improvement’ have taken 
on somewhat narrower and more technical definitions than these broad 
evaluative conceptions suggest. There are two main aspects to this. First, 
the appraisal of quality in healthcare is taken to require a particular kind 
of evidence. Second, quality improvement practice has become associated 
with a set of distinctive improvement techniques.
The methodological, evidence-based assessment of the quality of 
healthcare goes back, at least, to Florence Nightingale’s pioneering work 
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in the Crimean War demonstrating the (positive) relationship between 
hospital admission and mortality and her efforts, following this, to develop 
a standardized system of classifying diseases and to systematically track 
mortality rates (Maxwell 1984). But the ‘quality movement’ in healthcare 
took off in the second half of the twentieth century, when scholars and 
clinicians started to measure systematically deficiencies in medical care, 
including iatrogenic harms, the use of unnecessary and ineffective medical 
procedures, and geographical variation (Berwick 2008). Central to this 
approach—ideally, at least, if not always in practice—is the use of robust 
evidence to justify claims that interventions have led to improvements in 
quality (Marshall, Pronovost, and Dixon-Woods 2013). While there is 
not a single, agreed way to characterize robust evidence, it will likely be 
obtained using measures that are valid—that is, they measure what they 
claim to measure—and reliable—they are consistent and reproducible 
(Pringle, Wilson, and Grol 2002). Evidence-based quality improvement 
practice also seeks to draw on the full range of evidence, rather than, for 
instance, basing decisions on the most easily obtainable data or, worse still, 
cherry-picking findings to suit personal or professional interests (Carter 
2018). A commitment to evidence-based quality improvement does not 
necessarily imply the quantifiability of quality, but numerical assessments 
of demographics, processes, and outcomes are commonplace as a way of 
securing justification for claims of good or bad practice.
The practice of quality improvement as a distinctive set of techniques 
or processes has its roots in the early twentieth century quality movement 
in industry, which sought to control manufacturing processes in order to 
reduce variation, eliminate waste, and improve productivity (Junghans 
2018). We will refer to the technical practice of quality improvement 
as QI, to distinguish it from other practices that seek to improve the 
quality of healthcare. A number of different QI methods grew out of 
this movement—approaches or tools designed to measure and evaluate 
current practice and systematically evaluate interventions designed to 
improve upon it. These include Plan-Do-Study-Act (PDSA) cycles, which 
use short cycles to implement and learn from interventions; Six Sigma, a 
systematic means of assessing the effectiveness of interventions; and Lean 
thinking, a set of tools aimed at reducing waste (Boaden 2009). These 
methods have been adopted in the healthcare improvement context as 
means of systematically evaluating healthcare practice and changes to 
practice. The use of these systematic QI methods, alongside an evidence-
based approach, is taken to give improvement practice a certain degree 
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of scientific rigor and credibility: interventions and their outcomes are 
assessed and recorded in a methodical and repeatable fashion (Marshall, 
Pronovost, and Dixon-Woods 2013).
Some QI practice focuses on the reduction of variation in outcomes. In 
these instances variation is taken to be, in itself, an indicator of avoidable 
harm to patients and deficiencies in health service delivery (Marshall, 
Pronovost, and Dixon-Woods 2013). The view that variation is prima 
facie undesirable takes the best outcomes to represent what it is possible 
for a health system to achieve and worse outcomes to represent avoidable 
deviation from that peak (Institute of Medicine, Committee on Quality 
of Health Care in America 2001). Achieving quality in healthcare means 
minimizing the gap between actual practice in any instance and best 
possible practice. Identifying some outcomes as better and others as 
worse requires some account of what good and bad healthcare look like. 
This will involve reference to the goals or purposes of healthcare, and an 
assessment as to which practices further these goals and which impede 
them. These QI practices are, therefore, underpinned by evaluative claims 
or assumptions about healthcare quality. The gap-closing conception of 
QI is not ubiquitous. A noteworthy alternative borrows from complexity 
science and argues that healthcare systems are complex, adaptive systems, 
within which a certain amount of variation in practice and outcome is not 
only unavoidable but also valuable and necessary for innovation (Plsek 
2001; Plsek and Greenhalgh 2001; Plsek and Wilson 2001; Wilson and 
Holt 2001). Such complexity models operate with a distinction between 
unavoidable, expected variation and avoidable variation that ought to be 
reduced, such as that resulting from error or waste (Plsek 2001). Again, 
some prior conception of the constituents of good or bad healthcare is 
needed to give content to these notions of waste and error. So complexity-
inspired QI practices are also underpinned by evaluative conceptions of 
healthcare quality. Without some idea of what would be good or bad 
healthcare, or of what function healthcare institutions are supposed to 
play, concepts such as efficiency and appropriate practice remain empty.
The evidence-based conception of quality is now well established and 
pretty much ubiquitous, and QI is largely seen as a scientific practice, 
built around a set of techniques (Health Foundation 2011). However, as 
we have indicated, technical QI practices operate with a prior notion of 
what constitutes good and bad healthcare. Without this, there is no way 
of distinguishing evidence that is relevant to assessments of healthcare 
quality from evidence that is irrelevant. The more technical conception 
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of QI leans upon a less technical and more straightforwardly normative 
account of good and bad healthcare and a specification of the goals 
and purposes of healthcare. In the next section, we explore some of the 
normative definitions of quality that have been proposed and adopted for 
use in healthcare improvement practice.
3. QUALITY AND MULTIDIMENSIONALITY
It is widely agreed that there are several different dimensions to quality, 
reflecting a range of purposes and goods that are relevant to healthcare. 
A number of different accounts of the multidimensional structure of 
quality in healthcare have been proposed, developed in diverse settings 
and for different purposes. Multidimensionality, and different accounts 
of multidimensionality, are key sources of the conceptual pluralism we 
are investigating. In this section, we briefly review some examples and 
summarize the significance and implications of multidimensionality. We 
argue that the specification of multiple dimensions of quality is typically 
context specific, and it endeavors to pick out the elements of healthcare 
quality that are salient for a given policy context or healthcare system, 
rather than to specify a universal definition of quality. Quality, we go on 
to suggest, is therefore best understood to be not just constitutively plural, 
but also competitively plural.
Avedis Donabedian (1978), an early advocate of quality assessment in 
healthcare, specifies two components to the quality of the performance 
of individual medical practitioners: technical aspects, which reflect the 
performance of the doctor or healthcare provider, and interpersonal 
aspects, which reflect the relationship between the patient and their 
doctor. Donabedian (1988) takes different dimensions of quality to be 
salient depending on the scope of assessment. If the quality of a healthcare 
institution—rather than an individual doctor—is being assessed, amenities 
of care, which covers factors such as comfort, privacy, and convenience 
of access, is added to the dimensions of quality. If the quality of the care 
received by the patient is the object of assessment, the contribution of 
patients and family members to care should also be recognized. If the scope 
of assessing quality is the care received by a population group, equality 
of access to care becomes salient.
Another early example of a multidimensional concept of quality, 
developed by Heather Palmer in her discussion of quality in ambulatory 
care, is not dissimilar from Donabedian’s account. Palmer specifies 
three dimensions: accessibility, which reflects the “equitable and timely 
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distribution of appropriate healthcare to those with equivalent need”; 
acceptability, which captures the “degree to which healthcare satisfies 
patients”; and technical competence, which is the “coordination of 
knowledge, skill, and judgment in delivering appropriate technology to 
improve the health of patients” (1988, 120). Other definitions include 
Robert Maxwell’s (1984) six-dimensional concept of quality: effectiveness, 
social acceptability, efficiency, access to services, equity or fairness, and 
relevance to need.
The US-based Institute of Medicine (IOM) developed a six-part 
definition of quality in healthcare, which perhaps remains the most widely 
used today (Institute of Medicine, Committee on Quality of Health Care 
in America 2001). Healthcare, it contends, should be safe, effective, 
patient-centered, timely, efficient, and equitable. NHS Improvement—the 
body that is responsible for overseeing UK National Health Service (NHS) 
Foundation Trusts, NHS Trusts, and independent healthcare providers—
develops a concept of quality with four dimensions, which leans on the 
IOM definition (NHS Improvement 2017): NHS organizations should be 
safe, effective, caring, and responsive. Interestingly, NHS Improvement 
treats finance and use of resources and operational performance (or 
timeliness) as separate from quality per se, but nonetheless part of good 
performance of NHS providers.
For the concept of quality in health care to be multidimensional, it 
must have several different parts that are mutually constitutive of quality. 
A multidimensional concept of quality is thus constitutively plural. 
The different dimensions make distinctive contributions to an overall 
assessment of quality. It is possible to show ways in which the dimensions 
can intersect and inform one another. For example, dimensions involving 
safety and those relating to clinical effectiveness are likely to be interrelated 
and mutually constitutive. The same is likely to be true of dimensions 
concerning equity and those relating to access to services. However, the 
different dimensions are not reducible one to another. That is, the meaning 
and value of one dimension cannot be explained in terms of the meaning 
and value of any of the others; each makes a discrete contribution to 
quality. Moreover, the multidimensionality of quality implies that quality 
is not separable from its constituent parts. To improve or worsen along 
any or all of the dimensions doesn’t lead to or cause an improvement or 
worsening in quality, it just is to improve or worsen quality. This need 
not necessarily imply that there is nothing that can be said about quality 
in general or overall, but it does suggest that claims about overall quality 
must refer to its constitutive dimensions.
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In none of the above proposed conceptions of quality are the dimensions 
straightforwardly mutually maximizable. They are, to some extent, in 
tension with one another, such that improving along one axis might 
introduce constraints along others. This means that the dimensions must 
sometimes be traded off against one another. So, for example, maximizing 
safety may constrain timeliness because safety checks and measures 
to reduce the risk errors and adverse effects can add time to clinical 
interactions. Improving cost efficiency may constrain clinical effectiveness 
when additional clinical benefits are deemed not to represent value for 
money. And clinical effectiveness may constrain patient-centeredness or 
social acceptability, if achieving the best clinical outcomes fails to represent 
the patient’s wishes or social conventions regarding appropriate care. 
Some such trade-offs will be deemed reasonable and justified; others will 
be deemed unreasonable and unjustified. Defining and improving quality 
involves balancing a range of things we value, which are compatible only 
in a limited sense.
This is not to say that the dimensions of quality are necessarily or 
always in tension. Sometimes improving along one dimension will lead 
to or amount to an improvement along another dimension. So, for 
example, improvements in clinical effectiveness might lead to better 
financial efficiency, if they reduce expensive readmissions, iatrogenic 
harms, or unnecessary care. Indeed, the definitions of the dimensions can 
overlap, meaning that improving on one dimension—equity, say—creates 
improvement on another—such as patient-centeredness—by definition. 
The relationships between the dimensions are complex––sometimes they 
are in tension, sometimes in agreement––and while they are understood 
to be distinctive in their contribution to quality, this does not imply that 
they are entirely mutually exclusive.
The multidimensionality of quality and the tensions between the 
dimensions together mean that ‘quality’ is not a single property or attribute 
of the healthcare system that can be maximized but, rather, an assessment 
grounded in a number of other attributes.1 Healthcare can go well or 
badly in multiple ways and can produce, or be constitutive of, different 
combinations and quantities of multiple goods. While it might be possible 
to make an overall assessment of quality based on assessments of the 
dimensions, it is unlikely that anything like a simple ranking of quality 
states could be produced.
The classification of quality into multiple dimensions is typically a 
pragmatic activity. That is, the dimensional structures are not, and are not 
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intended to be, exhaustive or universal accounts of the structure and value 
of healthcare. Each is developed in a context, for a particular purpose, 
given a set of goals, aims, and values. Some accounts of healthcare quality 
are explicit about their pragmatism. Donabedian, for example, suggests 
the following:
The definition of quality may be almost anything anyone wishes it to be, 
although it is, ordinarily, a reflection of the values and goals current in the 
medical care system and in the larger society of which it is a part. (1966, 167)
And similarly, Donabedian argues that “the standards [of good health care] 
reflect current knowledge and orientations, and are subject to change as 
knowledge advances and the scope of provider responsibility is redefined” 
(1968, 182). Maxwell also makes a distinctly pragmatist assertion about 
the multidimensionality of quality:
The definition of the six dimensions and precisely how many dimensions there 
ought to be are far less important than the acceptance of multidimensionality, 
the flavour of the dimensions, and of the policy trade offs among them. 
(1992, 174)
Other accounts are more implicit about the context- and purpose-specific 
nature of their definition of quality. The IOM, for example, writes, “The 
committee proposes six aims for improvement to address key dimensions 
in which today’s health care system functions at far lower levels than it 
can and should” (Institute of Medicine, Committee on Quality of Health 
Care in America 2001, 5). This suggests that the proposed concept of 
quality is intended to address a particular problem at a particular point 
in time. NHS Improvement (2017) details a number of practical, specific 
aims attached to its five themes, which include quality, suggesting that 
their definition is also attached to a specific purpose.
The pragmatic nature of the definitions of quality means that they 
do not seek to capture everything that could possibly be thought to be 
important about healthcare. Rather, they aim to specify a set of values that 
are central to good healthcare in a particular context with a particular set 
of purposes. Accounts of quality that do no explicitly include something 
as a dimension do not thereby have to deny its relevance to the quality 
of healthcare. Some of the definitions discussed highlight ways in which 
healthcare can be good or bad that are not captured by others. Maxwell’s 
relevance dimension captures the importance of assessing the clinical needs 
of patients in the context of the needs of others in their community; this is 
not captured by other conceptions. The IOM’s equity dimension captures 
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something about the distribution of health and quality of care across a 
community. NHS Improvement and Donabedian both focus on the quality 
of the relationship between clinicians and patients, via their caring and 
interpersonal quality dimensions respectively, something not explicitly 
covered in other definitions. Some arguably important values, such as 
quality employment (that is, high standards of employment practices in 
health services) and environmental sustainability, do not feature in any 
of the mainstream concepts of quality.
Since the definition of quality is a pragmatic matter, ‘quality’ is therefore 
a multiply realizable concept. That is, it can be instantiated in a number 
of different ways depending on the particular context or problem in 
question. Different multidimensional definitions of quality may reflect 
different priorities or commitments. This suggests that quality is not only 
constitutively plural but also plural in a more radical way, which might be 
deemed competitively plural—that is, it is subject to variation, including 
disagreement, that arises from different vantage points and perspectives.2 
Competitive pluralism about healthcare quality entails not just that there 
is reasonable disagreement about the correct definition of quality, but that 
there are many different conceptions of quality that can be appropriately 
invoked in different contexts, the specifics of which will depend on 
the features of particular settings and the contrasting purposes behind 
the definition and measurement of quality. Different multidimensional 
frameworks should, thus, be understood to be heuristic tools that enable 
practitioners and policy-makers to discuss, measure, and assess quality in 
healthcare in practical settings, rather than attempts to capture the essence 
of quality or to provide a universal definition. This, moreover, indicates 
that in order to carry out QI projects, practitioners need to interpret 
quality for their own purposes and can draw on a very broad range of 
potential conceptions and dimensions of quality in so doing. This may 
involve choosing an existing multidimensional framework or adapting an 
existing framework to suit their purposes and, in some instances, it could 
involve developing a new framework.
4. OPERATIONALIZING QUALITY
Doing QI, at least under the dominant evidence-based paradigm, involves 
operationalizing whatever conception of quality is under consideration. 
That is, abstract values such as efficiency, effectiveness, and safety, or 
other dimensions of quality that are salient in particular instances, must 
be specified in such a way that it can be determined whether the healthcare 
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practice under scrutiny embodies them or not. In this section, we argue 
that the activity of specifying quality for given contexts and purposes 
corresponds to a third sense in which quality is plural, which we denote 
operational pluralism.
Practicing QI involves making assessments of the quality of a particular 
healthcare service at different points in time, for example, before and 
after an intervention has been made. This requires some account of what 
quality means, specifically, in the context in which healthcare quality is 
being assessed. This is not to say that QI practitioners must first come 
up with an abstract concept of quality and, subsequently, decide how to 
define and measure that concept in practice. The appropriate conception of 
quality for a particular QI project might emerge only from consideration 
of actual activities and practices. However, practicing QI requires, at some 
point, detailed specification of the dimensions of quality. There are several 
aspects to such specification:
i.  Weighting and trade-offs. Specification involves selecting relevant 
dimensions of quality and determining how to weight them and trade 
them off against one another. Weighting involves deciding whether 
any of the dimensions should be prioritized over others—such that it 
has more influence in assessments of quality—or whether all should be 
treated as equal contributors to quality. Determining trade-offs between 
dimensions involves specifying the scope of each dimension vis-à-vis 
the others. For example, determining the scope of cost effectiveness 
involves specifying the point at which increased benefits to clinical 
effectiveness, safety, and patient-centeredness are no longer worth the 
additional cost. The weighting and trade-offs that are adopted will 
reflect the priorities, values, and goals of those seeking to assess the 
quality of healthcare services. Different approaches to weighting and 
trade-offs will lead to different assessments of quality.
ii.  Indicators. Specification also involves identification of indicators for 
each of the dimensions. An indicator is a feature of the healthcare 
service under consideration, the presence of which denotes high or 
low performance along a given dimension. For example, clinical 
effectiveness in prescribing might be indicated by conformity with best-
practice guidelines—a high degree of conformity indicates, all other 
things being equal, greater clinical effectiveness. Timeliness in a hospital 
emergency department might be indicated by reasonable waiting times 
for patients. And patient-centeredness in general practice might be 
indicated by the involvement of patients in all significant decisions 
about their care. The indicators for each dimension are likely to be quite 
different depending on the context under consideration; the measures 
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and practices that are required for an emergency service to be safe are 
different from those needed in a GP surgery, a hospice, or a maternity 
ward. Moreover, in a given context, selecting different indicators 
of quality dimensions will generate different assessments about the 
realization of the dimensions in the service under consideration, and 
so different assessments of quality.
iii.  Metrics. Specification requires the identification of metrics for the 
indicators. In order to determine whether a clinical service exhibits the 
specified indicators for the dimensions of quality, some standardized 
means of assessing the service is required. For example, conformity 
with best-practice guidelines might be measured by determining the 
percentage of patients discharged on first line treatment. Adherence 
to reasonable waiting times might be determined by measuring the 
percentage of patients admitted, discharged, or transferred within 
a four-hour window. And the extent to which patients are involved 
in all significant decisions about their care might be measured using 
an assessment of patient experience via the Picker Institute patient 
reported experience measure. Measurement need not necessarily 
involve numerical quantification. However, it must involve at least 
comparable quantification. That is, when two different services, or the 
same service at different points, are compared, it must be determinable 
which has more or less of the relevant indicator (or if they are equal 
in this respect), even if it there is no way of giving an exact amount by 
which one is higher than the other. Without some way of comparing 
different possible states in which a service could be with respect to the 
indicators, there will be no way of reliably determining its achievement 
of the determinants of quality (Pringle, Wilson, and Grol 2002).
iv.  Data sources. Finally, specification will involve the identification of 
the data source used to determine achievement of the metrics. So, 
for example, the data source for measuring prescribing rates might 
be clinical audit records; the data source for the time taken to admit, 
discharge, or transfer a patient might be individual patient records; 
and the data source for assessments of patient experience might be the 
results of a recent practice-wide patient experience survey. Selecting 
the appropriate data source will likely be a largely pragmatic matter, 
depending on time, resources, past data collection practices and 
projects, infrastructure, technological equipment, expertise, and so on.
The way in which weighting, trade-offs, indicators, metrics, and data 
sources are considered, assessed, and decided upon can be intentional or 
inadvertent, and it can be done thoughtfully or carelessly. If it is done 
thoughtfully it will be well suited to the purposes and priorities of the group 
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seeking to assess quality. Otherwise, there is a risk of the context-specific 
nature of quality being overlooked and particular conceptions being taken 
to represent quality in instances where they are ill-suited. But regardless 
of whether they are made well or badly, decisions about the weighting of 
dimensions, and specification of indicators, metrics and data sources are 
a necessary part of healthcare improvement practice, as any assessment 
of the quality of healthcare services involves such operationalization of 
high-level conceptions of quality. Recognition of the ways that quality is 
operationalized for use in improvement practice indicates a third way in 
which quality can be thought to be conceptually plural. That is, the same 
multi-dimensional quality framework can be operationalized differently, 
in different contexts, and given different improvement-related aims and 
purposes. We call this operational pluralism.
Quality, then, is conceptually plural in a number of different ways, 
of which we have highlighted three.3 Practicing healthcare improvement 
requires focus and prioritization. Whether at a system level or in a specific 
healthcare context, it is necessary to select some combination of concerns 
as the focus of effort. At both a system level and a local level, improvement 
priorities will typically arise from practical judgments about where things 
could be done better. Such judgments might be informed by particular 
problems or failures that have been recorded, or by documented variation 
in outcomes. Improvement practitioners will need to identify and prioritize 
a set of quality-oriented measures and interventions in order to resolve 
these issues. In each case, ‘quality’ will be translated into some specific 
set of dimensions and indicators, reflecting context-specific concerns. Up 
to a point it is possible to work in parallel on different sets of concerns 
but there are practical limits to this. All this has the potential to magnify 
conceptual diversity and lead to a fragmentation of quality assessment: 
if different concepts, weightings, definitions, and measures are used in 
different contexts, different—and incommensurable—assessments of 
quality will result. The assessments will be incommensurable to the extent 
that they are grounded in different definitions and a different specification 
of quality, and thus to the extent to which they are simply considering 
different things. The remainder of this paper considers how far such 
fragmentation should be resisted or welcomed.
5. THE VALUE OF DIVERSITY
In their 2016 paper, “Does Quality Improvement Improve Quality?” Mary 
Dixon-Woods and Graham Martin highlight the need to look beyond 
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small-scale QI projects and to “act like a sector” in order to improve the 
quality of quality improvement (2016, 193). This, they suggest, involves 
greater coordination of QI activities. Dixon-Woods and Martin highlight 
the advantages of a sector-wide approach to QI. In particular, sector-wide 
thinking helps to limit inefficiencies whereby different teams develop 
localized solutions to the same problem and fail to share their findings 
with others. A localist approach does not represent good use of resources 
and may cultivate routines and processes that are only applicable in certain 
contexts. Such practices encourage what they call “projectness”—“a 
sense that QI is a series of bounded, time-limited events, rather than a 
continuous commitment, and overly focused on ‘innovation’ rather than 
replication” (Dixon-Woods and Martin 2016, 192). Dixon-Woods and 
Peter Pronovost (2016) argue that local uncoordinated interventions can 
have unintended consequences, leading to worse outcomes overall, despite 
fixing a particular problem at a local level.
To some extent, variation in QI practice is inevitable, and this is 
recognized by proponents of the sector-wide approach. In order for the 
same intervention to work in different demographic, institutional, and 
geographic circumstances, different local variations will need to be modeled 
and developed. However, for a sector-wide approach, these different 
variations should contain the same “core, non-negotiable elements” 
(Dixon-Woods and Martin 2016, 193). One reading of this could be that, 
while different contexts might call for slightly different local solutions, 
the goals and purposes of improvement and the definition of quality 
should be consistent across contexts. This need for some core stability in 
quality conceptions is captured by the concern that local QI projects may 
undermine quality overall if not coordinated with respect to the system-
wide goals of quality.
Underpinning these arguments for coordination are very important 
considerations that do not depend upon the claim that QI efforts should 
be sector wide. If QI initiatives focused on the same set of quality concerns 
are to be directly comparable across any settings—even just across a 
couple of institutions— then there is some need for consistency in the way 
quality is interpreted. This degree of consistency facilitates system-level 
comparisons of cross-institutional quality measures. It also increases the 
chance of accumulating the kinds of data that are typically sought within 
evidence-based QI, data that enable QI practitioners to learn both at 
scale and from one another’s efforts, and to coordinate the efficient use 
of constrained, and often shared, resources. In many cases, in order to 
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comprehend how good healthcare is in one context, it will be necessary 
to compare measures of its processes and outcomes with other relevant 
contexts. These concerns suggest that there is a limit to the degree to 
which diversity of quality conceptions is practically desirable. When there 
is good reason to compare healthcare practice across settings, there will 
be reason to coordinate quality conceptions.
A full-blown version of a sector-wide approach could require that some 
overarching conception of quality must be shared by the system as a whole 
for QI to effectively improve quality. An extreme version might even assert 
that all QI projects should be centralized. But more moderate versions 
might permit diversity across local QI projects on the condition that they 
reflect shared, system-level goals, in order to avoid conflicts relating to 
the definition and specification of quality. In all cases, any move towards 
standardization of QI would require some agreement upon a clear and 
distinct definition of quality in healthcare. This, in turn, would require 
substantial agreement about and specification of the goals of healthcare.
However, adopting such an approach to QI simultaneously constrains 
diversity. Establishing a single conception of quality across a system, or 
even across two or more settings, prevents different priorities from being 
pursued locally. Because of the complex interaction between the dimensions 
in a multidimensional concept of quality, adding or removing a dimension 
from the structure will have implications for the remaining dimensions. A 
dimension cannot be added or prioritized at a local level whilst maintaining 
the same weighting and trade-offs between other dimensions. This means 
that only when QI projects use the same overall definition of quality will 
they be measuring the same thing and will their assessments be strictly 
commensurable. Even if two different conceptions of quality include 
the same dimension—safety, for example—their respective assessments 
of safety cannot be assumed to be capturing the same thing unless their 
conceptions of quality also share the same overall structure. Furthermore, 
quality must be consistently operationalized in order for measures across 
different settings to be comparable. Therefore, for a local QI project to 
measure and improve healthcare quality in terms that can be accepted as 
such by any other QI initiative, the two must use the same definition of 
quality—with the same dimensional structure and the same specification 
of the dimensions. Moreover, using one legitimate conception of quality 
to assess QI practice that is based on another legitimate but divergent 
conception of quality is to employ an inappropriate standard of assessment. 
Much hangs, then, on the legitimacy of divergent conceptions of quality.
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As discussed above in §3, different attempts to define quality in healthcare 
do not typically seek to settle on a universal or final characterization, but 
rather try to develop a definition that is appropriate for a given purpose. 
Any particular definition of quality, even those intended for system-wide 
use, and however well developed, will only provide a partial and context-
limited concept. The complexity of QI as a practice stems, in part, from 
the open-ended and plural nature of the purposes and goals of healthcare 
(Greig, Entwistle, and Beech 2012). And consequently, working with a 
single definition of quality is liable to obscure some of the legitimately 
diverse goals which different actors have and is likely to overlook some 
of the complexity of healthcare quality. QI actors who are differently 
positioned will have good reasons to prioritize different conceptions of 
quality by emphasizing different dimensions, specifying those dimensions 
differently, and operating with different thresholds and targets of success. 
These reasons will reflect the diverse roles and responsibilities of actors, 
different judgments about feasibility, pragmatic factors such as the 
presence or absence of resources, and different judgments about what 
combinations of relevant goods matter most. Local definitions of quality 
will also be shaped by the contingencies of shifting policy and institutional 
expectations and norms.
Advocating standardized definitions of quality implicitly endorses a 
rather technicist approach, whereby improving quality is a matter of 
working out the most efficient way to achieve some pre-agreed end. But 
the choice of quality conceptions, including the tailoring of conceptions 
undertaken by differently positioned QI actors, is an inherently normative 
business. This means that it can only ever be a technical process in part. 
It involves choosing out of the many possible ways of defining and 
measuring quality, and recognizing that different approaches will lead to 
different assessments of quality. These choices, in turn, imply different 
accounts of what good and bad healthcare looks like. This is true both 
with respect to the broad definition and the definition of dimensions of 
quality, but also with respect to more detailed aspects of the specification 
of quality. Planning or evaluating QI adequately involves recognizing that 
ideas of quality are plural and contested, reflecting diverse and sometimes 
competing accounts of what we want from our healthcare institutions and 
practices. Settling on a definition of quality, in broad and specific terms, 
does not, then, involve determining what quality in healthcare ‘in fact’ 
involves so much as thinking carefully about what good healthcare would 
look like in this context. This may, in turn, require consideration of shared 
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social and political values, as well as reflection on the nature of health and 
its place within a broader social and personal context. This value-laden 
decision-making is central to decision-making about quality; unless such 
reasoning is made explicit, the values underpinning QI practice will be 
obscure and may lack justification (Carter 2018).
Of course, not all candidate definitions of quality are legitimate. Merely 
saying that something is an example of good quality healthcare doesn’t 
make it so. However, mere contradiction with other conceptions of quality 
should not alone discount a new conception. Additional reasons are needed 
to think that one of the alternatives is better suited to the context or system 
in question. This indicates that the concern—highlighted by advocates of 
the sector-wide approach—that local interventions can have unintended 
consequences that lead to worse outcomes overall needs to be considered 
in context. Clearly some local interventions may have consequences which 
conflict with system-level conceptions of quality, but these may not always 
be unintended, and they may be justified.
This might appear to ‘pass the buck’ onto procedural considerations. 
That is, in absence of a substantive solution to the definition and 
specification of quality, a set of procedural standards is needed to 
determine, or at least to indicate, how to settle on an appropriate, context-
specific account of quality and how to determine whether an existing 
account of quality is appropriate or not. A full discussion of adequate 
decision-making processes about the definition of quality in healthcare is 
beyond the scope of this paper, but we will finish this section with a brief 
reflection on these questions, which we intend to pick up in future enquiry.
The arguments presented in this paper suggest that the search for 
a set of procedural standards for appropriate decision-making about 
healthcare quality cannot sidestep the context-and-purpose-specific nature 
of healthcare quality. The different contexts in which decision-making 
about quality arises will be characterized by different decision-making 
timescales, varying access to data and information, different stakeholder 
groups to which decision-makers are accountable, and different degrees 
of impact of decision-making outcomes. All of these, along with many 
other factors, will affect the kind of decision-making procedures that are 
appropriate in each case. For example, projects that affect larger numbers 
of people, involve multiple providers, or involve decisions with serious 
human consequences, are likely to involve higher standards of evidence, 
greater justification, and wider consultation of stakeholders than more 
localized, less consequential projects. The same factors that make it 
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necessary to use different definitions of quality in different contexts also, 
therefore, make it necessary to use different decision-making procedures 
in relation to defining quality in different contexts. Extending pluralism 
to the procedural domain is crucial because what is at stake here is not 
merely reasonable pluralism about the definition of quality, but reasonable 
pluralism about indefinitely many context-specific definitions of quality. 
The task of defining healthcare quality is one that arises repeatedly, in 
different contexts, and a procedural solution that is appropriate in one 
context need not be appropriate in others.
This does not mean that nothing whatsoever can be said about 
such decision-making procedures. Assessing the legitimacy of different 
conceptions of quality will likely involve determining whether the people 
who developed it thought carefully about the set of problems with which 
they were presented and whether they had good reasons for prioritizing 
some issues over others. It will typically require deliberation about the goals 
and purposes, implicit and explicit, of the healthcare system in question 
and of those who seek to assess and improve it. It might also involve 
consideration of the extent to which their definition secures agreement 
within the relevant community of stakeholders—the public, patients, 
commissioners, staff, and so on. However, what these stipulations involve, 
and the different standards of evidence, argument, and justification that 
are involved in their execution, are likely to be quite different in different 
contexts.
6. BALANCING STANDARDIZATION AND DIVERSITY
There is, then, plenty of room for legitimate disagreement about which 
aspects of quality should be emphasized in general and in specific cases 
and which conception of quality should be used. Although there are good 
arguments for forms and degrees of coordination between QI initiatives, 
coordination should not automatically be taken to entail consistency of 
definitions, but might sometimes mean clear mapping of the differences 
between definitions. There are advantages to a sector-wide approach 
insofar as it involves envisaging an overall picture of large-scale quality 
agendas, and this may support some elements of standardization, but 
there are limits to how far this standardization is desirable. Insofar as 
coordination across QI projects is important, such an approach needs to 
exhibit a reflexive awareness of the normative nature of quality conceptions 
and recognize the need to specify and balance different quality concerns in 
local contexts, at a system level, and between local and system levels. This 
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can be done more or less self-consciously and it is important to consider 
how we could do it well, or at least better. While standardization about 
the definition of healthcare quality is valuable in relation to given ends and 
purposes, it is not valuable for its own sake, and therefore justification for 
standardization and coordination needs to be sought in order to ensure 
that it does not stifle legitimate variation in quality conceptions.
Some QI responsibilities are relatively local––for example, those focused 
on improving the safety of specific local services––while others are much 
broader and will relate to institutions or even systems as a whole. In 
both cases there is a need to be aware of coordination challenges so as to 
avoid some of the limitations of ‘projectness,’ but system-level roles must 
clearly have a particular regard to quality coordination issues—they must 
pay regard to the range of relevant quality dimensions and to the dangers 
of well-intentioned efforts in one quality domain or part of the system 
undermining concerns in other quality domains or parts of the system. 
There is, doubtless, much value to be derived from QI projects that take a 
system-level approach. They allow us to compare practices and outcomes 
between institutions, to consider geographical factors, and to compare 
different commissioning contexts. But if the nature of quality is plural and 
contestable, then the value of coordination is limited. If there is no single 
correct or best way of improving quality in healthcare and of measuring 
quality and quality improvement, then standardizing QI efforts in line with 
pre-defined conceptions of quality will constrain the possible meanings of 
quality and the ways in which the goals and purposes of healthcare can be 
beneficially construed. Thus, standardization will always carry costs and 
require justification, and it will sometimes fail to be justified.
Accordingly, coordination of QI activities should be pursued only 
insofar as it does not quash legitimate local QI projects, and insofar as the 
conception of quality that coordinated efforts endorse is in fact appropriate 
in the contexts in which it is employed. If conceptions of healthcare quality 
are understood to be heuristic decision-making devices, such that there 
is no way of determining the best or correct overall characterization of 
quality, then tension between different accounts of quality can be seen 
as a predictable and valuable feature of healthcare systems rather than a 
predicament to be overcome.
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NOTES
1. It might, of course, turn out that the dimensions of quality are also multidi-
mensional and not straightforwardly maximizable.
2. This distinction between constitutive and competitive pluralism is adopted 
from Amartya Sen’s (1987) discussion of assessments of the standard of liv-
ing.
3. We take ‘conceptual pluralism’ to be ambiguous as to the sense in which a 
concept is plural. Depending on the theory of ‘concept’ that you are operat-
ing with, you might take competitive pluralism and operational pluralism to 
entail that there are many different concepts of quality or to entail that there 
is one concept of quality which is realized in a variety of ways. We intention-
ally leave this open here.
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